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7.1  Introduction 
Debate about the treatment of interest and “the banking imputation” 
in the national accounts, long smoldering, has recently been rekindled 
(see Haig 1986; Ruggles and Ruggles 1982; Ruggles 1983; Sunga 1967, 
1984; Rymes 1985,1986; and Mamalakis 1987). The debate is important 
for two reasons. First, the satisfactory integration of money and banking 
and general equilibrium theory has not yet been achieved (cf. Gale 1983). 
If money, or, more precisely, the services  of money, were a private  good, 
then one would argue that such services would be privately produced 
and that modern general equilibrium theory would satisfactorily incor- 
porate money into value theory. A growing literature  argues that central 
banks are fifth wheels and that monopoly fiat money exists solely as a 
device for governments to levy “distorting” taxes. Keynesian mone- 
tary theory argues that central banks produce a public good, stability, 
and that its value enters into the determination of all relative values in 
a Keynesian momentary general equilibrium. What appears in neoclass- 
ical general equilibrium as a set of “distorted” values representing the 
unfortunate existence of inefficient central banks, in  the Keynesian 
framework is a demonstration that neoclassical general equilibrium value 
theory cannot be carried over to a monetary economy. 
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This theoretical debate is of absolutely vital importance for the sec- 
ond aspect reviewed  in this paper:  the measurement of  the nominal 
output of banking and rates of saving and wealth at the sectoral and 
aggregate levels in a monetary economy. 
The basic problem that this paper addresses then is what effects on 
measures of output, rates of saving, and wealth derived from the na- 
tional accounts are generated by different theoretical  approaches as- 
sociated with the measurement  of banking. What measures, derived 
from monetary theory, can be proposed, and how will such proposals 
affect measured output, rates of saving, and wealth? 
7.2  A Simple National Accounting Illustration of  the 
Banking Problem 
A representative statement of revenues and expenses of Canadian 
banks is shown in table 7.1. 
In the national accounts, interest receipts and payments are regarded 
as part of  the distribution of the net returns to capital originating in 
various activities. If one takes the labour costs and profits before taxes 
in table 7. I, adds to them interest payments by banks (on the argument 
that such payments, along with dividends, represent the distribution 
of the net returns to capital arising in banking), and deducts interest 
receipts (on the argument that such receipts represent the distribution 
to banks of the net returns in activities other than banking), one has 
Labor costs  2,400 
+ Profits before taxes  1,250 
3,650 
+ Interest payments  6,920 
10,570 
- Interest receipts  10,725 
= Net domestic product  -  155 
Table 7.1  Representative Revenues and Expenses,  Canadian Banks (millions 
of Canadian dollars) 
Expenses  Revenues 
Interest payments  6,920  Interest receipts  10,725 
Intermediate inputs  1 ,OOO  Service charges  845 
Labor costs  2,400 
Profits before taxes  1,250 
Taxes  435 
Dividends  227  -  - 
1 1,570  11,570 
~~~~~  ~ 
Source; Figures are based on data in Revell (1980). 359  Nominal Output of Banks, Sectoral Rates of Saving, and Wealth 
That is, the net (of depreciation) value added or net domestic product 
originating in banking is negative. 
If one estimates net value added or net domestic product originating 
in  the banking  activity  directly  by  means of deducting intermediate 
inputs from gross outputs (where only the service charges are treated 
as the gross outputs), then  the same result  occurs. This anomalous 
result  leads national  accountants to adopt the so-called  banking im- 
putation, which amounts to the assertion that banks do not fully charge 
depositors and lenders for the services they render and are compen- 
sated by paying less interest on deposits than they earn on loans-that 
is, the banks are delivering an underpriced service, and depositors are 
loaning their money to the banks in an offsetting underpriced  way. It 
is as if  there were a barter arrangement outside the price system be- 
tween banks and their customers. Then, in line with “usual”  national 
accounting practices, imputations are made.’ 
In Canada (Statistics Canada 1975; 3:201), the imputed value of the 
service rendered by the banks is in effect the difference between in- 
terest flows, and this is added to the gross output of  the banks. We 
then have 
Labor costs  2,400 
+ Profit before taxes  1,250 
3,650 
+ Interest payments  6,920 
+ Imputed interest payments  3,805 
- Interest receipts  10,725 
= Net domestic product  3,650 
or Gross output  845 
+ Imputed gross output (interest  3,805 
receipts  10,725 - interest  pay- 
ments 6,920) 
= Total gross output  4,650 
= Net domestic product  3,650 
Part of the imputed gross output of the banks, that deemed to be 
purchased by households, is part of consumer expenditures. An equal 
amount is added to consumer income, in the form of imputed interest 
receipts. The absolute savings of the household sector  is left unchanged. 
However, since  both consumption expenditures and  household  in- 
vestment  income are increased  by the same amounts, then the mea- 
sured rate of saving is reduced by the imputation. In current practice 
(which this paper questions), as is shown in table 7.2, the effect for 
Canada is miniscule. 
With  respect to the  savings of the business sector, which  are the 
undistributed  corporate  profits  and  net  income  of  unincorporated 
Less: Intermediate inputs  1,000 360  Thomas K. Rymes 
Table 7.2  Incomplete Effects of  Interest Imputation on Personal Rate of 
Saving, Canada, 1975-85  (millions of Canadian dollars) 
Personal 
Personal  Expenditures  Rate  Rate of 
Disposable  on Goods  of  Interest  Saving 
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Source; GNP Division, Statistics Canada. The rate of saving (adjusted)  is computed by 
subtracting imputed interest receipts from disposable income and imputed expenditures 
on banking services from expenditure on goods and services. 
enterprises, there is no effect. The imputation does not affect the un- 
distributed corporate profits of the banks. In Canada, though the im- 
puted gross output produced by banks, beyond that which is treated 
as the purchases of households, should be deducted, as an intermediate 
input, from the gross output of  nonbanks to obtain their value added, 
the remaining imputed interest flows from the banks to the nonbanks 
would leave nonbank corporate profits and the net income of nonbank 
unincorporated enterprises unchanged. In fact, in Canada the noncon- 
sumer flows of  imputed gross outputs and interest distributions  are 
routed through a “dummy” banking industry so that measures of value 
added and gross domestic product originating in the nonbanking sectors 
in  the Canadian national accounts are too high. Total gross domestic 
expenditures and products are affected, then, only with respect to the 
imputations that pertain to households’ use of the services of banks.2 
If  some of the imputed  services of  the banks are treated as part of 
government expenditures or as part of private capital formation, total 
gross domestic expenditures and product and rates of  saving would be 
additionally affected. 
To the extent that nonresidents would be deemed to be net purchasers 
of  the services of  domestic banks, then aggregate domestic product 
and expenditures would be further increased by the imputations that 
would be added to exports. Of  course, if  Canadians were deemed to 
be purchasers of banking services produced abroad, then, for house- 
holds, the imputed expenditures would be added to consumption ex- 361  Nominal Output of Banks, Sectoral Rates of Saving, and Wealth 
penditures  and  imports,  whereas  the  imputed  interest  receipts  by 
Canadians would appear as part of exports. It remains the case, how- 
ever, that the imputations for banking services do not affect the balance 
of  payments on current account or the measures of  absolute savings 
of  the  rest-of-the-world  sector in  the national  accounts. In  fact, in 
Canada, no imputed  expenditures by  nonresidents on the output of 
Canadian banks or imputed expenditures by residents on the output of 
non-Canadian banks are recorded. Imputed international banking ser- 
vices would, in general, affect merchandise trade balances. Since trade 
in  banking services is an important topic in policy discussions about 
freedom from nontariff barriers to trade, and since, as I  shall argue 
below, the output of  banking services cannot be measured indepen- 
dently of  monetary policy, the  better measurement  of  international 
trade in banking services is a matter of  some pri~rity.~ 
The measurement of  banking output, obtained by  the usual appli- 
cation of the economic theory of the firm producing goods and nonfi- 
nancial services and the corresponding national accounting conventions, 
yields then meaningless results. The various treatments-(  1) the stan- 
dard national accounting imputations,  (2) the “spreads”  convention 
(Mintz 1979), and (3) the Ruggles-Sunga treatment of interest receipts 
and payments as “rentals” received and paid for the use of money and 
therefore as gross outputs and intermediate inputs of the various ac- 
tivities and not therefore as the distribution of the net returns to cap- 
ital-while  all having different effects on the measurement of the outputs 
and  inputs  of  banks, and  while not  affecting measures of  absolute 
savings, do affect measured rates of saving. 
The important question is, however, which of the various measures 
has theoretical support.  Is, in  fact, the  current treatment  of  banks 
leading to meaningless results? Are the various palliatives such as the 
banking imputation really improvements? Do the measures of output, 
the rate of  saving, and wealth that result have theoretical significance 
and defense? 
With respect to stocks, in the national accounts balance sheets, the 
stock of fiat money, because it is an asset of the private sector and a 
liability of the public sector, does not appear as a component of overall 
national wealth. 
For the private sector, fiat money in the form of nonprivate circulating 
currency and reserves of the banking sector with the central bank are 
considered  as part of monetary wealth. (Without this component of 
wealth, the famous Pigou-Kalecki-Patinkin “real balance effect” would 
apparently not appear as an ultimate determinant of the overall price 
level in  macroeconomic  theory.) Bank deposits (and any private cir- 
culating currency) would not be treated  as wealth since such assets 
would be liabilities of the private banks. Yet  this distinction between 362  Thomas K. Rymes 
inside and outside money has never been satisfactory (cf.  Johnson 1969; 
and Lucas 1986). Indeed, in  a world  in which  fiat money is created 
essentially through deposits of the government with the Monetary Au- 
thorities that are switched to private banks for reserve creation, the 
distinction between inside and outside money breaks down. The value 
of the buildings, computers, and so forth in private and central banks 
is part of reproducible wealth. Moreover, actual stocks of reproducible 
wealth will reflect the efficacy with which banking operations are pri- 
vately and collectively provided. Is it not double-counting to add the 
capitalized value of the promise of stability in monetary arrangements 
brought about by central banks, inspectors-general of banks, deposit 
insurance  corporations being effected through private banks, and hence 
the rest of the economy? 
Resolution of  these problems awaits a satisfactory general equilib- 
rium theory of banking, to which I now turn. Such a theory must at 
least explain why private banks do not pay the same rates of interest 
on deposits as they  earn on loans and levy explicit service charges 
short of  the costs of such services provided. 
The theory or theories must, that is, explain or predict the national 
accounting banking problem and the need for the imputation. I present 
two very simple theories. One I call the neoclassical theory, the other 
Keynesian. With these two theories in hand, I return to the measure- 
ment problems outlined in this introduction. 
7.3  On the Neoclassical Theory of  the Efficiency of Banking5 
7.3.1  Introduction 
The regulation of banking by Monetary Authorities or central banks 
leads to Paretian inefficiency. Optimum money supply policies result 
in banking services being efficiently priced. The regulation by the Au- 
thorities determines the relations between interest rates on loans and 
deposits of banks and between the service charges levied for banking 
services and the cost of those services (cf. Merrick and Saunders 1985). 
7.3.2  An Outline of the Model 
The optimum neoclassical monetary growth model is used to  portray 
inefficient  pricing by banks. A representative agent, who maximizes 
intertemporal utility,  uses the services of  labor not  supplied to the 
representative competitive bank, the services of commodity capital not 
held by the bank, and the service of the bank as  metered by the service 
of real bank deposits to produce the one commodity output. The output 
is consumed or is added to the stock of capital or is exchanged for an 363  Nominal Output of Banks, Sectoral Rates of Saving, and Wealth 
increase in deposits with the bank, where it appears as an addition to 
bank capital. All agents taken together have their “real” bank deposits 
change as the price level changes. Therefore, the flow of bank services 
or bank output for all banks taken together, given the nominal stock 
of bank deposits, is a function of the overall price level (Johnson 1972). 
The services of bank deposits, and therefore the services of banks, are 
of  two kinds. A transaction service is provided  such that, for given 
amounts of nonbank capital and labor, a larger flow of this service of 
banks will  result in a larger final output. A portfolio or store of value 
service is also performed by banks and bank deposits. Banks pay in- 
terest on bank deposits, and, the higher the rate of interest, the greater 
will be the demand for real bank deposits. For the services provided, 
in particular, the transaction service, banks levy a service charge, and, 
the lower the service charge, the greater will be the demand for real 
bank  deposits as agents attempt to obtain more  of  the transactions 
services provided by  the banks. 
All nominal high-powered or fiat money created by the Authorities 
is randomly distributed among the banks in the form of deposits with 
the Authorities so that, as an important and restrictive simplification, 
there is no circulating currency (cf. Friedman and Schwartz 1986; and 
Selgin 1988). 
Banks produce bank services by using labor supplied by the agents, 
capital obtained from the agents as they substitute real bank deposits 
for capital, and the services of  real high-powered, fiat money or re- 
serves. The services of the reserves stand for the services of the Au- 
thorities and can be obtained only through such deposits. 
7.3.3  The Competitive Bank 
ducing primarily transaction services6 is said to maximize 
In a deterministic version of the argument, a competitive bank pro- 
IIB = [6M -  (i -  p)]MIP + RLIP +  (iH  -  p  - 6,)HIP 
- WLB -  6KB + XI [MIP - (LIP + KB  + HIP)] 
+ X*[MIP -  M/P(KB,  LB, HIP)] + X, 
w.r.t. LIP, MIP, Ks, LB, HIP, where nB = the commodity value of 
profits; MIP  = the commodity value of  homogeneous bank deposits; 
LIP  = the commodity value of homogeneous bank loans; HIP  = the 
commodity value of  homogeneous  bank  deposits  (reserves or high- 
powered money) held by the bank with the Authorities; LB = the flow 
of labor used by the bank; Ks = the stock of capital used by the bank; 
?jM = the service charge paid by depositors, expressed as a rate on 
deposits, for the services rendered by  the bank; i = the nominal rate 
of interest paid on bank deposits; p  = the expected equal to the actual 364  Thomas K. Rymes 
rate of inflation in the money price of the commodity; R  = the com- 
petitive net rate of  return to capital earned on loans; iH = the nominal 
rate of interest paid by the Authorities on the bank deposits or  reserves 
with them; 6,  = the service charge paid by the bank, expressed as a 
rate on deposits or  reserves, for the service rendered by the Authorities; 
W  = the commodity rental on labor; 6  = the rate of depreciation on 
the commodity stock of capital;  MIP = LIP  + Kn + HIP is the balance 
sheet constraint; MIY  = M/P(K,, LB,  HIP) is the production function; 
P  = the overall price level; and x  = the lump-sum changes in high- 
powered money created by the Authorities. 
Competitive banks primarily provide a transaction service obtained 
by using and holding over any period an average volume of  bank de- 
posits. The transactions service of banks is indexed by the services of 
bank  deposits, and  these flow  services are indexed  by  the stock of 
“real”  bank deposits. Service charges are, in reality, complex, con- 
sisting of  a variety of fixed charges and varying charges per debit and 
credit entries on depositors’ accounts.’  1 simplify by expressing the 
service charge as a rate. 
The technology of  banking service requires the services of  capital 
and labor and the services of the Authorities, obtained by the banks 
by holding deposits in turn with the Authorities. Again, the transaction 
service of  the Authorities is indexed by the services of high-powered 
money,  and, again, the flow  of  services of  high-powered  money  is 
indexed by  the stock of  “real”  deposits of  the banks with the Au- 
Table 7.3  Explicit Service Charges Paid to Banks, Canada, 1985 
Composite service plans (e.g., Scotia Club) 
Service charges on personal deposits 
Nonpersonal deposit charges 
Night depositories 
Guaranties on letters of credit fees 
Funds transfer service fees 
Acceptance fees 
Credit card discounts and fees 
Service charges on mortgages 
Standby loan fees 
Other loan fees 
Safety deposit boxes 
Canada Savings Bonds commissions 
Security investment services fees 
Safekeeping 
Computer service revenue 
Contractual management fees 
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thorities just as the services of capital are indexed in neoclassical anal- 
ysis by  their stocks (Fischer 1974). The transaction services rendered 
by the Authorities could be clearing arrangements or deposit insurance 
arrangements (cf. Goodhart 1987, 1988) that lead banks to hold reserves 
with them. 
A single bank competes for reserves by  attempting to acquire de- 
posits (or borrowing from agents) with the increased deposits taking 
the form of additional reserves and/or capital stocks. It is assumed that 
the banking service technology exhibits constant returns to scale. The 
single bank  takes  as given the  price  level, service charges, and all 
interest  rates  and  knows  confidently the  steady-state  inflation rate. 
From first-order conditions for profit maximization, we have 
which reveal that only if  bank deposits earn the competitive rate of 
return, that is, if i -  p  = R, will the transaction service rental of bank 
labor and capital be metered by their respective marginal products and 
only if the Authorities pay the competitive rate of return on reserves, 
that is, if  iH -  p  = R, will the price of  the transactions service pro- 
vided by the Authorities be metered by the value of the marginal prod- 
ucts of  such services. We  will then have 
_-  8H  dMIP 
6M  dHIP 
- -  (KB, LB, HIP). 
The latter conditions are those required for Paretian efficiency in  the 
provision of banking transactions services. 
The zero-profit condition entails 
[6M -  (i -  p) + R]M/P = (R  + 6)KB + WLB 
+ [R -  (iH -  p) -k  6HlHlP 
so that, if R  = i -  p  = iH -  p, then 
6MMlP = (R + 6)KB +  WLB + 6HH/P, 366  Thomas K. Rymes 
or the price  of  the banking  service will  equal the marginal  cost of 
providing  that service. The link between the Authorities  not  paying 
competitive rates on reserves, differences between loan and deposit 
rates, and service charges not equaling the marginal cost of the pro- 
vision of banking services is what this paper seeks to establish. 
With 6 set by technology and sH,  iH,  and p  set by the Authorities, 
the unknowns to determine are R, ?iM,  W, i,  and P-the  net rate of 
return to capital, the service charge on bank deposits, the wage rate, 
the interest rate on bank deposits, and the overall price level. 
In the foregoing, the price level  is one of the things given to the 
competitive bank. However, at  the market level of analysis, the services 
of bank deposits and bank reserves and therefore the services of banks 
and the Authorities cannot be determined independently of  the price 
level. The determination of the price level is the sine qua non of  the 
neoclassical quantity theory of money. In much of the banking litera- 
ture, the codetermination  of the level of  output for all banks and the 
general price level is not investigated because such analysis is generally 
concerned with single competitive banks (see, e.g., Baltensperger 1980; 
Elyasiani  1982; Klein  1971; Santomero  1984; Spellman  1982; Tobin 
1984; and Hancock 1985). Consideration of the price level, as I  shall 
show, is also vital for the national accounting banking imputation. 
From the first-order conditions for capital and real reserves, for any 
labor input, there will exist  portfolio  balance  relations for different 
amounts of bank capital and real reserves that ensure that the value 
of the gross marginal physical product of bank capital equals the com- 
petitive gross rate of return or rental on capital and that the value of 
the gross marginal physical product of real reserves equals the com- 
petitive net rate of return or rental on capital plus the service charge, 
if  any, levied by the Authority  minus the real rate of interest paid by 
the Authorities on real reserves. These relations, which were set out 
in similar form by Keynes (1936, chap. 17), are 
and are illustrated in figure 7.1. Figure 7.1 has the following interpre- 
tations. If R  = i -  p  =  iH  -  p,  then, from the bank capital relation, 
there are combinations of real reserves or the services  of the Authorities 
used by banks and the services of  capital such that the value of the 
gross marginal product of capital in banking equals the competitive 
gross rate of return or  rental on capital. Those combinations are shown 
by  the curve denoted K;.  Similarly, there are combinations  of real 
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Fig. 7.1  Capital and real reserves for banks 
product of  the services of  Authorities  in banking equals the service 
charge levied by  the Authorities. Those combinations are shown by 
the curve denoted HIP*.* There is one combination of bank capital and 
real reserves such that portfolio equilibrium would hold, namely,banks 
w,yld  be  content  to hold  capital and  real  reserve  stocks.  KB and 
HIP. If the Authorities then set iH -  p  < R,  then the banks would seek 
to hold fewer reserves. If the banks were able to generate lower real 
reserves, then real capital stocks would be earning less than the going 
rate of return, and both capital and real reserves would be reduced to 
Ks  and H/e  where again portfolio equilibrium would be attained. Since 
nominal reserves are determined by the Authorities, real reserves can- 
not be altered unless the price level is changed, and, of  course, com- 
petitive banks by themselves and together cannot determine the price 
level. 
If  the interest rate on deposits was lower, and so, proportionally, 
was the service charge on bank deposits, then the portfolio balance 
relations would be unaffected. If the reduction in the service charge 
was less in proportion than the interest rate on bank deposits, then 
both curves Kg  and H/P would shift and intersect at a point such as 
Eo in figure 7.1. To show that the change in the interest rates on deposits 
and the service charge is connected with the change in policy by the 
Authorities, it is necessary to consider the behavior of the represen- 
tative agent. 368  Thomas K. Rymes 
7.3.4  Nonbanks 
The representative  agent maximizes 
w = lj  U(C,)e-p'dt, 
where  U(C,)  is the instantaneous utility function with the usual prop- 
erties, U' > 0, U < 0, and  p is a constant rate of  time preference, 
subject to 
C[K(t),  Ltt),  MIP(t)] + (i-p - 6M)M/P(f) 
+  WL,(t) - Kit) - M'/P(t) = C(t), 
where C(t)  is consumption; Kit) and MI&)  ar_e investments in com- 
modity capital and real bank deposits; C[K(t),  L(t).  MIP(t)l  is the gross 
output of  the flow of consumption goods as a function of the services 
of the stock of capital, labor, and the services of the stock of real bank 
deposits (with again the services of  bank deposits indexing the trans- 
action services of banks); i -  p  - 6, is the nominal rate of interest 
on bank  deposits less the confidently  expected steady-state rate  of 
inflation less the service charge (as a rate); and WL,(t) are the wages 
paid by the banks. The technology C[K(t),  Ltt),  MIP(t)]  entails that the 
production of  consumption, now assumed subject to constant returns 
to scale, is positively  related to real bank deposits or the services of 
banks in the sense that a lower use of the transactions services of banks 
would necessitate more labor and capital to produce the same level of 
consumption. In this paper,  I ignore bank loans and assume for sim- 
plicity that agents demand bank deposits services, will give up capital 
to the banks for such deposits, and will supply labor to the banks. 
The optimum solution entails 
dJdL  (K,  L, MIP) = W, 
dJdK(K, L,  MIP) - (6  + p) + ~;Ic  = 0, 
d,  IdMIP(K,L,  MIP) + i -  p - (6,  + p)  + q;Ic = 0, 
where  q is the elasticity of the marginal  utility  of consumption with 
respect to consumption.  In the steady state, 
dJd~  (K,  L, MIP) - 6  = p =  RK, 
d,ld,,,(K,  L,  MIP) - 6,  + i -  p  = p  = RM. 
With  normalization on labor, a  second portfolio  balance  diagram is 
provided in figure 7.2. There are, for C = 0, combinations  of K  and 
MIP  such that K is  also zero. Similarly, again  for C = 0, there are 369  Nominal Output of  Banks, Sectoral Rates of Saving, and Wealth 
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Fig. 7.2  Capital and real deposits for nonbanks 
different combinations of K and MIP such that MJP is zero. A steady- 
state combination  (K*,  M/P*)  of  real nonbank  capital and real bank 
deposits is such that the net marginal rates of transformation between 
present and  permanent  consumption through  either capital or bank 
deposits equals  p, the  steady-state  rate  of  return.  The steady-state 
combination depends on i -  6,  -  p,  the net of  the service charge 
real rate of  interest  earned on bank deposits.  If  i -  p  is equal to  p, 
then 
dC/aM/p(K*, MIP*) - 6,  = 0, 
that  is, the amount  of  K*  and  M/P* would  be  such that  the gross 
marginal rate of  transformation between present and permanent con- 
sumption through bank deposits would be equal to the service charge 
equal to the marginal social cost of producing such services. 
The efficient steady-state equilibrium in  which the Monetary  Au- 
thorities pursue the optimal money supply policy, such that iH -  p  = p, 
that is, the Authorities pay the steady-state competitive real net rate 
of return on reserves, entails that i -  p  = p, that is, the real interest 
rate on bank deposits will also equal the competitive real net rate of 
return. Thus, all service charges, expressed as rates, would equal the 
values of the marginal physical products of the services of real reserves 
and bank deposits. For bank deposits, then, in steady state we would 
have 370  Thomas K. Rymes 
p  = dJdM,p(K*, M/P*) +  i*  -  p - 8&, 
such that p = i*  -  p entails dC/dMlp(K*,  M/P*)  = S,&. 
Could the same equilibrium exist if i <  i*  and SM < ti,&  but i - 8M = 
i*  - 8&? The answer is no. A reduction  in a,,,,  entails a reduction in 
the price of bank services relative to P, the overall price level, so that 
real effects must follow. A lower overall price level entails real effects 
such that the contemplated equilibria other than p  = i*  -  p would not 
exist. 
7.4  The Model (and Stability) 
If the Authority sets iH  -  p less than p, the banks' demand for real 
reserves will be less, and they will attempt to supply fewer real deposits, 
which results in lower interest rates being paid on bank deposits. Agents 
in turn would want to hold fewer bank deposits or demand fewer ser- 
vices because of the lower interest rate, which would result in lower 
service charges. Agents wishing to hold fewer bank deposits are, how- 
ever,  simultaneously  wishing  to hold  more stocks of  goods (as are 
banks), and the price of goods in  general will be higher  so that the 
relative price of banking services in terms of the numeraire commodity 
must be lower. The higher price level is associated with lower amounts 
of real deposits and rese~ves.~  The real deposits and reserves are as- 
sociated with higher gross marginal rates of transformation  between 
present  and  permanent  consumption through  reserves and bank de- 
posits  to  offset  the  difference  between  iH  -  p -  8H and  between 
i -  p - 6,  and  p. The lower real  reserves and deposits in turn are 
associated with lower amounts of real capital. 
The argument is partially illustrated in figure 7.2.  One starts with 
optimum monetary  arrangements and the observed allocations M/P* 
and K*. The Authority then sets iH  -  p < iH*  -  p. Banks therefore 
have a negative excess demand for reserves at the existing price level. 
In competing less for reserves, the banks attempt to supply fewer bank 
deposits and so generate lower interest rates on bank deposits. The 
lower interest  rates on bank  deposits will  be associated with  agents 
demanding fewer bank deposits and bank services. 
Two effects follow: If service charges could be lower pari passu with 
interest rates on bank deposits (a possible partial equilibrium result), 
then the negative excess  demand for bank deposits would be eliminated, 
but the negative excess demand for reserves would  remain. The re- 
duction in the service charges will be less, however, because as part 
of a generalized increase in the excess demand for goods the price of 
all consumption in general, including bank services, will rise, offsetting 
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but not preventing a decline in the relative service price of banks. The 
result is a dashed MIP = 0 locus in figure 7.2 and a dotted temporary 
equilibrium locus that indicates that at the higher overall price level, 
which equalizes rates of return on capital and real bank deposits,*O  the 
temporary equilibrium rates of return to capital and real bank deposits 
would be be!ow  p, agents will save less, and a new steady-state equi- 
librium, MIP,,  KO,  would exist. By the simplifications on the balance 
sheet MIP = Ks  + HIe it follows that in the banking sector there will 
be a new steady-state equilibrium HIPo, KO,  such that the volume of 
the transaction services of banks would be lower. 
The inefficient steady state entails that real interest rates on bank 
deposits are less than p with 
dC  -(KO,  MIP,)  - 6,  = p -  (i -  p)  > 0, 
dM/P 
-  (Keo,  HIP,)  - 6,  = p -  (i,  -  p)  > 0. 
dMIP 
dH/P 
The Authorities, by setting iH  -  p less than p, behave as  a monopolist 
constrained by pecuniary behavior to max.imize (say) the inflation tax, 
and the community  experiences the associated welfare losses.  That 
behavior by the Authorities shows up not only in the “distortion”  of 
relative interest rates and relative prices but in a “distortion”  of the 
price level (the once-over change in the level of prices is the key to 
the argument) as compared to that state that results from the optimum 
money supply policy. It is these “distortions” that lead to the standard 
observations that interest  rates on bank deposits are less than those 
on bank loans and that the service charges banks levy do not cover 
the cost of the services provided. Again, the argument depends on the 
supposed ability of the Authorities to effect changes in  i,  -  6H -  p 
independently of x, the lump-sum tax transfer mechanism,  an ability 
this paper assumes. This is a requirement for the supernonneutrality 
results to hold (see Dornbusch and Frenkel  1973). 
To recapitulate, then, the levying of a tax by the authorities, that is, 
their failure to pursue the Friedman-Lucas  optimal money supply policy 
of paying the competitive real rate of return on reserves results in banks 
earning a higher rate on their loans than they pay on their deposits and 
in  the value of the transactions services provided by the banks being 
greater than the service charges collected. These are, however, pre- 
cisely the conditions that give rise to the problem of measuring nominal 
banking output and that lead national accountants to embrace the bank- 
ing imputation “resolution” of  the problem. 
It will  be noted that only one “distortion”  has been introduced- 
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on reserves. Generalizations  and extensions would  appear possible. 
Additional  “distortions”  would  be imposed  if  the Authorities  com- 
pelled the banks to hold (binding) legal and varied cash reserve ratios 
or to set some ceiling to the interest rates banks could pay on deposits 
or could earn on loans”-to  name just two examples. 
Technical objections to the neoclassical general equilibrium theory 
of  efficient banking  (cf. Harkness 1978; Sargent and Wallace  1985; 
Bewley 1985; Milbourne 1987), while of concern (cf. Rymes 1972), are 
not as important as the obvious fact that it leaves no room for a theory 
of central banking.  In the neoclassical  theory,  the failure of  central 
banks or Monetary Authorities to pay competitive interest rates on fiat 
money  results  in  a  “distorting”  tax. The Authorities  must be con- 
strained (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) to follow optimum money sup- 
ply  policies  and must not behave in a discretionary  fashion because 
such behavior may not be effective in affecting real nonmonetary vari- 
ables such as the volume of unemployment  and can lead only to de- 
partures,  such as inflation  or a  reduction in  iH  -  p, from efficient 
monetary arrangements. A central bank, constrained to pay competi- 
tive interest rates on reserves and to replicate other competitive con- 
ditions, is not a central bank. As Wills (1982, 258) argues: “A  system 
with a mandatory  cash base on which  the marginal cost of funds is 
paid is equivalent to an unregulated system.” In our simple case, the 
reserve base is not mandatory, but, even in the case in which the interest 
rate on reserves is set below the competitive rate, banks will still hold 
such reserves if  such holdings permit them to access the provision of 
(say) deposit insurance by the Authorities, such insurance potentially 
obviating the phenomenon  of  bank  runs (see Diamond  and Dybvig 
1983). The “tax”  still applies since a service charge would be and is 
levied by the Authorities for the service provided. 
However, if  the reserves did earn the competitive rate of return, it 
would be possible for the reserves to be privately produced and held 
and for the Monetary Authorities to provide the insurance service other 
than through the reserves of the competitive  banks. Similarly, the banks 
could hold their reserves privately, and the Monetary Authorities could 
provide interbank clearing or transaction services without the need for 
the banks to hold reserves with the Authorities.  Such insurance and 
clearing services could be provided  privately,  in which  case the ra- 
tionale for Monetary Authorities or central banks has completely van- 
ished. The services of competitive banks would be efficiently priced, 
the service charges would cover the costs of the banking services, or 
the transactions services of bank deposits and the set of prices asso- 
ciated with the transition-production technology would be observed to 
be but a part of standard monetary general equilibrium analysis (Fama 
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1985). The special problems associated with the measurement of bank- 
ing output would have disappeared. 
All  this  results from the nonexistence of  a satisfactory theory of 
central banking in the foregoing analysis. I now turn to that crucial 
problem. 
7.5  The Model (and Instability): An Introduction to the Keynesian 
Theory of Banking 
In the analysis so far, global stability in a rational expectations perfect 
foresight sense has been assumed. Had global instability been assumed, 
nothing could have been  said.  What about the rational  expectations 
saddlepoint instability argument? In figure 7.3, I illustrate the problem. 
In figure 7.3, suppose there exists an optimal steady state, (K*,  M*/P). 
Suppose the equilibrium is “disturbed” by a change in the capital stock. 
If lower, it would appear that, in  a temporary equilibrium, as agents 
tried to go from bank deposits into goods, the rise in the price of goods 
would so reduce M/P that further decumulation and a further rise in 
prices  would  occur.  The economy would be off  into infinite capital 
shallowing and ever-hgher price levels. If the capital stock were greater, 
it would appear, for temporary equilibrium to hold, that the price of 
goods would fall, resulting in further accumulation, and the economy 
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Agents would know, however, that the Authorities would engage in 
monetary reform to prevent such inefficient outcomes. In the first case, 
agents would  be compensated for the reduction in  the real  value  of 
their bank deposits; the extent of such expected compensation would 
be  such  that  agents  would  seek to hold  greater,  not  less, real  cash 
balances;  the initial price level would  be lower, not  higher; and  the 
temporary equilibrium would be on the stable arm of the saddlepoint 
equilibrium, labelled  TE, in  figure 7.3. In the second case, the value 
of bank deposits would be reduced by the monetary reform. Agents, 
knowing this, would  seek to hold fewer real deposits, and the price 
level would be higher rather than lower, putting the economy in tem- 
porary equilibrium again on the stable arm of the saddlepoint equilib- 
rium  TE,, (Sargent and Wallace  1973; Begg  1982; and Sheffrin  1983, 
1981). 
The unique stable perfect foresight path is not connected with any 
rules the Authority would follow but is in fact a product of the supposed 
discretionary power of the Authority to provide the stability. 
The saddlepoint  instability  may  arise because of myopic expecta- 
tions-a11  agents, for example, may not know exactly what the steady- 
state rate of inflation must be and are sufficiently misguided to adapt 
their inflation expectations to the different rates of inflation that would 
exist along any sequence of temporary equilibria. The saddlepoint equi- 
libria can also arise from the specification of the basic transformation 
schedules C(K,  L,  MIP) and MIP(Kg,  Lg, HIP) so that second-order 
conditions may not be secure. In figure 7.3, the relative slopes of the 
portfolio balance relations have been altered to reflect this possibility 
of a transactions technology that is consistent with instability. 
Suppose that the Authority, endeavoring to increase efficiency, raises 
the real rate paid on reserves and that the real rate of interest net of 
the service charge on bank deposits increases. Then, as illustrated in 
figure 7.3, the MjP = 0 locus is shifted upward to MiP, = 0 because 
the net rate of return on real bank deposits, with  i -  p  - SM higher, 
would remain at p only if real bank deposits were much higher, ensuring 
that the gross marginal rate of transformation respecting consumption 
through bank deposits was lower. With no further action by the Au- 
thorities, the system would be unstable, off on a programme of infinite 
capital and real bank deposit accumulation. Action by the Authorities 
known by the agents to be required for monetary stability entails that 
the holding of real bank deposits will be penalized. The relevant unique 
perfect foresight stable path is along the temporary equilibrium locus 
TE,. Conversely,  if  the Authorities  caused the banks to pay  lower 
interest rates on deposits, then agents, trying to move out of deposits, 
would cause prices to rise at an accelerating rate, and the economy as 
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price  levels.  Again,  agents  who perceive  such a  possibility  will be 
expecting monetary reform such that the terminal value of their bank 
deposits will be greater than under the unstable scenario. The relevant 
temporary equilibrium locus becomes TE,. The extent to which reform 
must occur is such that in the first instance agents would seek to hold 
less real money and the price level would adjust instantaneously up- 
ward. The reason for this is that overall, taking into account the higher 
rate of interest on deposits and the reduction in the terminal value of 
the deposits, money is not as attractive to  hold. In short, the Authorities 
have made the holding of money less, not more, attractive. Similarly, 
in the second instance, the expected increase in the real value of bank 
deposits more than offsets the lower interest rates, and overall money 
is more attractive to hold. Again, the Authorities have in fact made the 
holding of money more, not less, attractive. 
An interesting problem emerges. The possibility of a unique perfect 
foresight path to a steady-state  equilibrium depends on the maintenance 
of stability by the Authorities. The efficiency of monetary arrangements 
depends not on the maintenance of a competitive real rate of interest 
on reserves but on the preservation  of stability  by the Authorities- 
assuming instability in the saddlepoint sense. What is then meant by 
the efficiency gains from an optimal money supply rule such as paying 
competitive real rates on the reserves of the banks? This question is 
particularly  relevant  when  cognizance  is  taken of the point  that at- 
tempted  maintenance  of optimum rules by the Authorities  may con- 
tribute to rather than reduce the instability  of the economic system. 
Discretionary  behavior by the Authorities,  when fully taken into ac- 
count by private agents, is stabilizing, whereas conduct of policy by 
rules is disstabilizing. 
Under the assumptions of neoclassical monetary growth theory, if 
global stability is assumed, the failure of the Authorities to follow the 
rule of paying competitive real interest rates on reserves involves wel- 
fare losses.  If  saddlepoint instability  is assumed, no rule will ensure 
efficiency. In fact, the announcement by the Authorities of a rule will 
necessitate at some time the announcement of a change in the rule- 
what some call “time inconsistency” in rules (Calvo 1978)-to  enhance 
the efficiency of the economic system. 
More important, if  stability is assumed, it is hard to see any role for 
Monetary Authorities. Optimum money supply policies entail the com- 
plete deregulation of  the banking activity. Optimum rules and laissez- 
faire banking are one and the same thing. Once the optimum rules are 
followed, interest rates on reserves and on deposits equal the com- 
petitive real net rate of transformation between present and permanent 
consumption  streams, all services performed  by the Authorities  and 
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marginal real resource cost of the services of banks. The central bank 
has no role to play. The problem with banks in the national accounts 
would, at least on this analysis, not exist. 
These conclusions are radically  altered if  saddlepoint instability in 
the rational  expectations sense is assumed in  which  the unique  se- 
quence of temporary equilibria to steady-state equilibria is a function 
of the rationally expected discretionary action of the Authorities. De- 
pending on the specification of the service  of bank deposits and reserves 
in production relations, the rule iM -  p  = p can lead to instability and 
is corrected into a unique sequence of temporary equilibria if and only 
if  the Authorities change the rule at some time. Then optimum money 
supply policy rules cannot be followed. 
The consequence of Monetary Authorities that act in a discretionary 
way is that the rules set out for efficiency in the case in which stability 
was assumed cannot apply. Banks will not earn the going net rate of 
return on their reserves, interest rates on deposits will not be the same 
as those earned on loans, and the service charges levied by the banks 
will not cover the cost of such services. In a world in which the Mon- 
etary Authorities play the essential role of ensuring monetary stability, 
then the sets of interest rates and service charges will generate precisely 
those characteristics that give rise to the banking problem outlined in 
the introduction to this paper. 
Reserves and, indirectly,  bank  deposits would  earn nonpecuniary 
liquidity premia (not part of the return on money balances in the neo- 
classical case) because the real value of the services of  money and 
hence the real value of the money stocks themselves are associated 
with the provision of the public good, stability, by the Authorities.  It 
is not  the service of money  that is a public good (cf. Weldon  1971; 
Laidler 1977) but the service of stability by the Authorities. 
7.6  The Problem of  Measuring Nominal Private and Central 
Bank Output 
What is the significance of  the theoretical  discussion for the mea- 
surement problems that are also the topic of this paper? Consider the 
neoclassical argument first. It was observed, under the optimum mon- 
etary policy argument, that for bank deposits 
dc  R  = -  (K*,  L,  MIP") + i -  p - 6, 
aM/P 
so that, where iM -  p  = R, then 
dC- 
-  (K*,  L, hf/P*) - 6~  = 0, 
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or 
8, 
6M = -  (K*,  L,  M/P*), 
8MlP 
that is, the rental price of the services of bank deposits or the price of 
the output of banks equals the value of the marginal product of such 
services. The banking imputation would not be needed, and the mea- 
surement problem associated with banks would not exist. 
For nonoptimum monetary policy, however, we have 
a,  R -  (i -  p) + 6w = -  (K,  L, MIP). 
8MlP 
The theoretical argument says that the nonoptimum value of the mar- 
ginal product of banking services will be equal to the difference between 
the competitive net real rate of return and the real interest rate paid 
on bank deposits (or R  + p -  i, the difference between the compet- 
itive net nominal rate of return less the nominal rate of interest paid 
on bank deposits) plus the service charge rate associated with banking 
services. 
This would appear to be precisely that which results from the ap- 
plication of the banking imputation procedure. If we assume that bank 
loans earn the competitive rate of return, then the imputed real gross 
output for banks will be, where MIP is the real value of bank deposits 
equal to loans, 
[R -  (i -  p) + S,]M/P, 
or the imputed nominal gross output for banks will be 
[R + p -  i + 6M]M, 
which is precisely what national accountants do. 
The “real”  gross output of  the banks, 
[R -  (i -  p) + 6M]M/P, 
which results from this imputation, reflects, however, the policy of the 
Authorities.  Given M, the greater the “distortion”  tax levied by the 
Authorities,  then,  by  the  preceding  argument,  the  higher  will  be 
the price level P (so that on this ground the lower will be the real gross 
output of the banks) and the lower will be  i -  p (offset by some possible 
lesser fall in 6,  because of the rise in the overall price level)-so  that 
on this latter ground the higher  will be the real gross output of the 
banks. 
The implication of the analysis is that the measure of output of banks, 
obtained from the banking imputations, is not independent of the policy 
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purchases of bank services so measured  and treated as intermediate 
inputs, then such real intermediate inputs in all other nonbanking in- 
dustries would also reflect the policy of  the Authorities. l2 
The imputation based on the neoclassical argument suffers, however, 
from a grave drawback. Corrections are made for interest  rates on 
deposits and service charges on deposits on the grounds of being too 
‘‘low,’’ but no account is taken in the imputation  procedure for the 
overall price  level being  too “high.”  At  the given level of  nominal 
deposits, then, the argument is that “real”  bank deposits are too low. 
Hence, were the imputation applied according to the neoclassical the- 
ory, the real value of bank deposits would have to be increased so that 
the imputed  gross output in  banks would  have  to be  greater.  This 
argument is based on the revision of interest rates and prices that are 
the components of the imputation and that would be reflected in the 
revision of prices in the temporary equilibrium accompanying the adop- 
tion of efficient policies by the Authorities.  It is not the revisions in 
interest rates and prices that will be associated with the full equilibrium 
adjustments in the economy. If correct, though, it means that the pres- 
ent banking imputation results in an underestimate of banking output 
and  value  added. It  is  conjectured that the effects  of  such revised 
imputations on measured rates of saving would be significant. 
There are further implications associated with the neoclassical anal- 
ysis. One of the inputs into the production  of the bank’s transaction 
service is the services of  the reserves or the services of the central 
bank. The neoclassical analysis implies that an imputed measure of the 
gross output of  the central bank can also be derived. 




8H = 6,  ~  (KB*, LB, HIP*), 
or  the rental price on reserves would equal the real value of the marginal 
product of real reserves or the service of the Authorities. Otherwise, 
we would have 
so that, even if  no interest was paid on reserves and no service charge 
was levied for the services rendered by the Authorities, the nominal 
interest rate, R  + p,  would be a measure of  the price of gross output 
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In general, the imputed real gross output of central banks would be 
[R -  (iH -  p)  + ~H]H/P, 
or the nominal gross output would be 
Since the burden of the neoclassical argument is that a central bank or 
Monetary Authority can be treated as if  it were a private bank-par- 
ticularly  so if  the optimum monetary policy  were pursued and Au- 
thorities charged for any services rendered-then  it follows that the 
banking imputation can be applied to central banks or Monetary Au- 
thorities  as well.  The banking  imputation  applied  to Monetary Au- 
thorities, just as when it is applied to private banks, would result in 
measures of  “real”  gross output that would  imperfectly  reflect  the 
policy being carried out by such Authoritie~.’~ 
In the Keynesian case, if  the banking imputations were employed, 
then the price of the gross output of the banks would meter not just 
the value of the marginal physical product of the transaction service 
of banks but also the liquidity premium attached to bank deposits for 
a service not produced by the banks, except indirectly through their 
holding of reserves, the liquidity premium being a measure of the con- 
fidence with which the Authorities are expected to perform their func- 
tion of  preserving monetary stability. The “failure”  of the Authorities 
to pay  full interest  on reserves (i.e.,  R > iH  -  p)  in the Keynesian 
case would not represent the imposition of a “distorting” tax but would 
reflect  the “price”  banks would  pay  for the provision  of  monetary 
stability by the Authorities obtained through the holding of reserves. 
Similarly, the “failure”  of the banks to pay full interest on deposits 
(i.e.,  R >  [i -  p])  in the Keynesian case again would  not represent 
the indirect  imposition of  a  “distorting”  tax by  the Authorities  but 
would reflect the “price”  nonbank agents would  “pay”  for the pro- 
vision  of  monetary  stability  by  the Authorities, obtained indirectly 
through the holding of bank deposits, since they, in turn, access that 
provision directly through the holding of reserves. 
In the case of the Keynesian theory of central banking and the re- 
sulting liquidity premia  on “money,”  application  of the national  ac- 
counting banking imputation confounds the measure of the rental price 
on banking  services with  the liquidity  premia  that results  from the 
provision  of  the  public  good, monetary stability,  by  the Monetary 
Authorities. 
From the theoretical  viewpoint,  the Keynesian analysis entails li- 
quidity premia being imbedded in all relative prices  since in modern 
monetary  economies all activities employ, directly and indirectly, as 
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indirectly  the provision  of  monetary stability  by  the Monetary  Au- 
thorities. There is no way to “price” the provision of monetary stability 
by the Authorities,  but the various liquidity premia are imbedded in 
the structure of relative prices with no operational way of separating, 
say in the case of the rental price of banking service, a&,,AK,  L, MP), 
the value of the marginal product of banking services from the liquidity 
premium on bank deposits. 
In general, therefore, the output of banks-in  particular,  the trans- 
action  services of  banks-cannot  be  defined  or measured indepen- 
dently of the conception and measurement of the output of the Monetary 
Authorities, which given the nature of the output cannot be measured 
in the ex post manner applicable to the national accounts. 
7.7  Relation to Measures of  Rates of Saving and Wealth 
The limited application of the banking imputation results in a lower 
rate of saving for the personal sector, though, as is shown in table 7.2, 
the effects are negligible. 
Governments can as well be treated as  (collectivities of) households. 
Governments hold deposits with private banks and central banks. (In 
fact, these government accounts, particularly switches between them, 
are part of the day-to-day operations of directionary monetary policy 
and are the mechanism by which increases in fiat money are brought 
into existence.) Government deposits with private banks are the means 
by which governments tap the transactions services provided by banks, 
and, since they are in this respect identical to households, the banking 
imputation would result in an increase in imputed government expen- 
ditures and imputed investment income. One could similarly argue that 
government deposits with the central bank are devices by which the 
government accesses the transactions services being provided by the 
central bank, and an imputation could be made for those deposits as 
well. Again, government expenditures and income would be further 
equally increased.  Each level of imputation would reduce the rate of 
saving of the government sector. 
The results then of the banking imputation is that the rate of saving 
of both households and governments is decreased.  l4 There remains the 
fundamental objection to the application of the imputation procedure, 
even assuming the applicability of the neoclassical general equilibrium 
theory of banking, namely, that for each and every variant of nonop- 
timum money supply policies there will be a different price level. It is 
understood that different nominal  money  supplies entail, by the un- 
derlying quantity theory of money, different proportionate price levels. 
Beyond that-and  this is the major point-if  one assumes that each 
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case that the price levels would differ. The greater the departure from 
optimality, the higher would be the overall price level. 
To summarize, the greater the departure of money supply policies 
from optimum, the greater, other things being equal, will be the banking 
imputation. The greater the banking imputation, the lower would be 
“after imputation”  rate of saving of households and governments. 
By the very nature of the problem, the attempted measurement of 
banking output must recognize  that such output can be ascertained 
only within the confines of a general equilibrium framework of banking 
and monetary analyses. The neoclassical theory set out provides such 
a framework. That theory immediately suggests that, while the standard 
imputation recognizes that interest rates and service charges on de- 
posits are too low, it should be additionally recognized that the “over- 
all”  price  level  is too  “high.”  If  the banking imputation  took into 
account that, the more extensive were the difference in rates on loans 
and deposits, the more the price would be too “high,”  then the imputed 
gross output of  banks would  be much higher than results from the 
present limited imputation, and measured rates of saving for the per- 
sonal (and government) sector would be even less. Such a result would 
be in  accord with the foregoing neoclassical  theory,  which predicts 
that, the more efficient the money  supply  policy  conducted by  the 
Monetary Authorities, the greater would be the rate of saving, at the 
temporary (and steady-state)  level of analysis.  Thus, the augmented 
banking imputation would be fully supported by neoclassical general 
equilibrium banking and monetary theory. 
The Keynesian theory recommends, however, against the banking 
imputation. The immeasurable liquidity premium on private bank de- 
posits,  a component of the service of bank deposits, arises because 
banks specialize in, or are required to hold, the holding of bank deposits 
with the central bank. The private banks then have direct access to the 
services connected with provision of  monetary stability by  the Au- 
thorities,  and nonbank agents have, through their bank deposits, in- 
direct access to such services. Since these services are public in nature 
and cannot be produced privately, no price can be found for them. The 
Keynesian framework rejects the argument that one can impute a mea- 
sure of the gross output of central banks, that is, a measure of the 
value of the marginal product of real deposits with the central bank, 
held either by private banks or government, since the crucial output 
of the central bank, the preservation of monetary stability, is not mea- 
surable (Acheson 1986). 
The crucial distinction between the Keynesian general banking and 
monetary general equilibrium and neoclassical theories can be seen by 
asking what treatment would be suggested if, for example, all banks 
were nationalized and became de jure, instead of de facto, agents of 382  Thomas K. Rymes 
the central  bank.  The rejection  by  the Keynesian argument  of  the 
imputation means that government expenditures in the extended gov- 
ernment sector would merely be redefined to include the expenditures 
on labor and materials undertaken by the bank (cf. Haig  1986). Esti- 
mates of  the rate of saving in  the personal  and government sectors 
would not be affected by the banking imputations since such imputa- 
tions would not be made. 
It was shown earlier that wealth measurement encountered the prob- 
lem of the distinction between inside and outside money. My discussion 
of the banking imputation problem permits  some advance as well in 
that discussion. 
If  the  “money”  in the neoclassical framework were outside, then 
the wealth of the private sector would be 
HIP*  + Kg  + K”  = MIP*  + K”, 
where the efficient monetary policy is pursued, and 
HIP + KB + K  = MIP + K, 
where it is not, with all components of such national wealth being lower 
the further away from optimality the monetary  policy would  be. No 
double-counting would be involved since, in the optimum policy case, 
the present value of the services being rendered by  the Authorities 
(e.g., deposit insurance or clearing arrangements) would be equal to 
the value of the deposit claims against the Authorities.  The capital 
stock held  by  the banks would  be part of the overall capital  stock, 
KB + K,  with K being the stock of capital in all nonbank activities. 
It was pointed out that the nominal addition to reserves, rather than 
being injected into the economy via the lump-sum transfers, x, could 
be brought about by  the switching of government deposits with  the 
central bank to the private banks. It will be remembered that circu- 
lating currency is being ignored. In this case, there would be no outside 
money-that  is, for the banks, real reserves as assets would always 
be offset by real government deposits as liabilities. The components 
of  a national  wealth  statement by  sector, ignoring  irrelevant  items, 
would be 
Government 
Deposits  with  private  banks  Government “bonds” held by the 




Deposits of the government 
Deposits of the private banks 
Deposits of the government 
Deposits of  the nonbank agents 
Private Banks 
Deposits with the central bank 
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Nonbanks 
Deposits with private banks 
Nonbank capital 
so that, with the deposits of the private banks with the central bank 
equal to the deposits of the government with the banks, the net worth 
of the private sector consists only of nonbank and bank capital. 
This  accounting  treatment of  the inside  money  case neglects,  of 
course, the fact that government deposits with the private banks are 
not a liability that would affect bank behavior in the same sense as the 
existence of  private deposits does. (Canadian bankers have, e.g., ar- 
gued that they should not be required to hold reserves behind govern- 
ment  deposits.)  Recognition  that  the  government deposits-reserves 
mechanism is part of the mechanism by which the Monetary Authorities 
seek to preserve monetary stability enhances  the validity of the Keynes- 
ian argument to the effect that, even in the case of “outside”  money, 
that money is not part of national wealth. Rather, it is the expectation 
of monetary stability that constitutes the monetary component of wealth. 
It will be captured in the value of nonbank and capital, KB + K,  and 
to add HIP to obtain a measure of private national wealth would involve 
double-counting.  Is 
Net worth 
7.8  Extensions and Conclusion 
7.8.1  Extensions 
Two extensions to the argument would appear necessary. First, the 
argument has assumed one homogeneous bank deposit. If Monetary 
Authorities impose different reserve requirements on different deposits 
in recognition that banks produce nonhomogeneous  banking services 
with different deposits also being associated implicitly with different 
transactions and portfolio services, the foregoing analysis would pre- 
dict different interest rates and service charges (e.g., savings nonche- 
quable deposits would  pay  higher  real rates and have lower service 
charges since such deposits would perform a greater flow of portfolio 
services and relatively limited transactions services such as currency 
withdrawals). A much richer theoretical model than I have presented 
would  be necessary to illustrate  and predict  such arguments. Also, 
many other dimensions of banking, such as monitoring and verification 
costs (cf. Chant 1987) and a more intricate transactions technology, 
would have to be explored. The essential connection between banking 
services and the Monetary Authorities must, however, be maintained. 
It would appear, from the Keynesian viewpoint, that it is the discre- 
tionary behavior of the Authorities that provides much of the rationale 
for  the  existence of  fiat  money.  Second, there  are other financial 384  Thomas K. Rymes 
intermediaries,  other than banks per se, that provide  differentiated 
banking services in the sense that some of them may have more indirect 
access to the services of the Monetary Authorities of a more indirect 
nature than the banks. In table 7.4, the distribution of  deposit interest 
paid to persons by deposit-taking intermediaries shows that banks are 
becoming perhaps relatively less important in the provision of  trans- 
actions services. A needed extension of the preceding theoretical ar- 
gument is to include transactions services provided by country banks 
such as trust companies and by those intermediaries that, in the limit, 
would not be classed as banks. 
While providing  but one measure of  the changing importance of 
banks in Canada, it must be remembered that the data in table 7.4 are 
drawn from  a decade in  which  some would  say there was a major 
increase in competition in Canadian banking with a sharp increase in 
numbers of banks following Royal Assent to the Bank Act in 1980 and 
important changes in central bank policy  with the addition and sub- 
sequent disowning of gradual monetarism and monetary targeting from 
1975 to 1982. 
7.8.2  Conclusion 
Two extremely simple general equilibrium theories of  banking have 
been examined with arguments that Monetary Authorities are seen as 
taxing the community by not following efficient monetary policies in 
the Friedman-Lucas sense or providing  the services, by  themselves 
and indirectly through private agents such as banks, of the public good 
monetary stability. Both arguments, as developed, predict that banking 
Table 7.4  Distribution of Deposit Interest to Persons, Canada, 1975-85: 
Major Deposit-Taking Intermediaries 
Quebec  Mortgage 
Savings  Trust  Loan  Credit 
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statistics lead to the apparent need for the banking imputation. In this 
connection, the significance of  these two arguments for measures of 
banking output, rates of saving, and wealth are examined. The neo- 
classical argument lends partial support to the current imputation pro- 
cedures but  reveals  that  such procedures  suffer from an important 
defect, which leads to the result that banking output is understated and 
rates  of  savings in  the  personal  and  government  sectors are over- 
stated-and  potentially substantially overstated. The less and less ef- 
ficient  is  the  monetary  policy,  the  greater  and  greater  are  these 
measurement effects. The neoclassical argument tends to include fiat 
money as a component of private wealth, though, the more and more 
it  is recognized that  the fiat money  is created  by  the inside money 
route, the more and more the neoclassical argument approaches that 
provided by the Keynesian theory of private and central banking. That 
theory provides no support for the imputation and arguments associ- 
ated with it and would, in comparison with the neoclassical argument, 
result in higher rates of saving of the personal and government sectors. 
The Keynesian theory concludes as well that it is the policy of  the 
promotion of monetary stability that contributes to wealth, that to add 
outside money to private national wealth would be to engage in double- 
counting since the real components of  wealth, reproducible capital in 
the banking and nonbanking sectors, already include the wealth-creating 
effects of  the promotion of monetary stability. 
Notes 
I. In this case, the imputations are radically different from those customarily 
made  in national accounting.  In  the case of  other imputations,  (1)  a set of 
equivalent  or nearly  equivalent  market  prices  is available that permits  the 
“pricing”  of  services  such as farm production  consumed  on farms and  the 
rents earned  on owner-occupied  houses (Rymes 1979), and (2) the case for 
the imputations is that changes in the distribution of resources between market 
and nonmarket institutional forms would, unless the imputations were made, 
result in undue variations in measured output. The banking problem is unique. 
The uniqueness is that (1) there is apparently not a set of equivalent or nearly 
equivalent prices that permits the pricing of banking output since there is no 
apparent market counterpart and (2) the invariance argument fails as well. 
A sophisticated version of  the invariance argument is that the barter-type 
arrangements between banks and depositors said to be implicit in the fact that 
banks  underprice  services they  are rendering  to depositors and  depositors 
underprice services they are rendering to banks arise because of  the payment 
of  taxes on interest receipts.  A household depositor will pay less in taxes if 
his deposit interest receipts are smaller and so will provide service to the banks 
at less than market prices to minimize taxes. The bank will compensate the 
depositor by reducing the service charges on bank deposits or what it is charging 386  Thomas K. Rymes 
for its service to depositors. The version fails to take account of the different 
interest rates-service  charges on different bank deposits-and  the fact that 
the nonuse of the price system induced by income taxes would not hold for 
transactions between banking and other industries. 
2. In the Canadian input-output accounts, the imputed intermediate output 
of the banks is, in fact, treated as part of  the intermediate  inputs of the nonbank 
industries. 
3. The Ruggles-Sunga  treatment of interest flows has fundamental ramifi- 
cations for the national accounts that are not discussed here. Their treatment 
of interest on the national debt would result, however, again in a reduction in 
the overall national rate of saving. 
4.  For the Canadian economy, standard measures of national wealth will 
include net claims on the rest of the world so that net holdings of fiat monies 
of other companies do appear as part of Canadian wealth. 
5. I have presented overviews of these arguments in my other work on the 
imputation problem (Rymes 1985,  1986). A full statement of the theoretical 
framework is necessary to assess the wider measurement problems considered 
in this paper. Earlier versions of this section of the paper have been presented 
to the Departments of Economics at Monash University,  the Australian Na- 
tional University, Carleton  University, McGill University, the University of 
Strathclyde, Manchester University,  the Churchill College Seminar in  Eco- 
nomic Theory, and the 1986 meeting of the Canadian Economics Association. 
I  am grateful to Courtney Wright,  Ian Harper, Ted  Seiper, John Pitchford, 
Nicholas Rowe, Steve Ferris, Randy Geehan, Jack Weldon, James Pickett, Ian 
Steedman, Partha Dasgupta, Jack Revell, John Chant, Jack Galbraith, Keith 
Acheson, and Leslie Milton for critical and helpful comments. 
6. In an appendix to this paper supplied on  request, the case of a competitive 
bank providing both transactions and explicit portfolio services is set out. 
7. In Fischer’s (1983) analysis, while the banks cannot produce their services 
without acquiring the services of real reserves obtained by holding deposits 
with the Monetary Authorities,  individual agents can obtain the services of 
banks without holding bank deposits. In my formulation,  the crucial transaction 
service supplied by a bank can be obtained only by holding and using a certain 
volume, on the average, of bank deposits. I do not deal with services such as 
safety deposit box rentals, the making up of pay packets, etc. as some of these, 
e.g., travel services, may have nothing to do with the banking service. Table 
7.3 lists the various explicit service charges paid to banks in Canada in 1985, 
along with their relative importance. 
8. The respective slopes of KS and HIP* in fig. 7.1 are based on the second- 
order conditions for the bank’s maximization problem. 
9. If  the overall price level is defined to include the nominal price of  the 
services of banks, then, of course, an index number problem is involved in 
what is meant by “real”  bank deposits and reserves. I ignore this complication 
in this paper. 
10. Agents seek to hold fewer bank deposits  and more stocks of commodities. 
There is a temporary equilibrium higher-price level such that, since real bank 
deposits are lower, the net rate of return on bank deposits rises because of the 
increase in the gross marginal physical product of real bank deposits and the 
net rate of  return to capital falls until such rates are equalized. Since the net 
rate on capital has fallen, it is now below the efficient steady-state rate. 
11. The latter is a type of “distortion”  not practiced in Canada since the 
1967 revision of the Bank Act (see Freedman  1983). That the failure of the 
Authorities to pay interest on reserves is a tax on transactions intermediated 387  Nominal Output of Banks, Sectoral Rates of Saving, and Wealth 
by banks is also argued by Wills (1982), though Wills pays no attention to the 
general equilibrium effects on service charges and the overall price level. 
12. In any given year, the nominal gross output of the banks would be 
[R -  (i -  P) + ~M]M 
so that changes in  the nominal  gross output would  reflect changes in R, i, 
p, tiM,  and M. A Laspeyres index of the ‘‘real’’ gross output of  the banks 
would be 
and a Paasche index would be 
where the expressions are in general vectors and the indexes are aggregators. 
For examples of some of the other problems involved in measuring the “real” 
output of banks, see Gorman (1969) and Geehan and Allen (1978). 
13. A reallocation  of  value added from private banks to the central bank 
would  be  involved. For instance, if  actual service charges were insurance 
premiums received by Monetary Authorities, such as the Canada Deposit In- 
surance Corporation (CDIC), all that would be involved, if  the CDIC were 
treated as a government business enterprise in the Canadian system of national 
accounts, would be a particular distribution of value added within the finance 
industry.  Similarly, with respect to the imputed service charges on reserves, 
they would be part of the gross output of the central bank, deemed to be a 
government business enterprise, and part of  the intermediate inputs of  the 
private banks. 
In Canada, an imputation for central banking output is made by splitting the 
expenditures on labor and other inputs by the central bank between the personal 
and government sectors and adding the personal component to imputed ex- 
penditures in the personal sector. The theoretical argument for this Canadian 
treatment is not clear. 
14. In Canada, only expenditures and interest income from private financial 
intermediaries are imputed to the government sector (no imputed expenditures 
on the Bank of Canada’s output is made). In the years 1981-85,  the ratio of 
government to personal expenditures for these imputations is about 7 percent. 
The effects on the rate of  saving for the government sector are quite insignif- 
icant, given the incomplete nature of the imputations. 
15. It is argued (cf. Patinkin  1972) that outside money is the value of the 
government’s monopoly right to issue currency. Such arguments beg the ques- 
tion of the need for the Authorities in the first place. 
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Comment  Anna J. Schwartz 
The focus of the paper is on the theoretical justification for bank im- 
putation. Two contrasting general equilibrium theories of  banking are 
presented, each of which predicts the apparent need for banking im- 
putation. One theory lends partial  support to the current imputation 
procedures; the other provides  no support. In this connection, the 
significance of the two theories for measures of  banking output, rates 
of  saving, and wealth is examined. 
Neither of Professor Rymes’s models seems to me to have anything 
to do with the need for bank imputation. My first question is how he 
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explains the need for bank imputation in Canada before 1935. Canada 
had no central bank until that year, so there is no basis either for a so- 
called neoclassical model in which the central bank does not pay the 
competitive rate of return on bank reserves or for a so-called Keynesian 
model in which the monetary authorities are providing monetary sta- 
bility. Commercial banks in Canada had no required reserves before 
1935 but  maintained prudential reserves of  about  10 percent of  their 
deposits that became  the required  reserve  ratio under the  Bank of 
Canada. 
Income is imputed to the banking industry, not because the author- 
ities fail to pay interest on reserves, and not because of the monetary 
policy followed by the authorities, but for the same reason that food 
produced  and consumed on farms is added to the national income, 
namely, that in both cases the aim is to include income in kind in the 
national  income  and  not  simply  income  associated  with  monetary 
payments. 
In the case of banking, there are two questions. First, is there income 
in kind, that is, are barter transactions being engaged in  that would 
bias the income account if  not allowed for? Second, why are those 
barter transactions carried out? It is easier to answer the second of 
these questions than the first. In  U.S.  commercial banking, at least 
since the Banking Act of  1933, barter transactions have occurred be- 
cause of  the prohibition of payment of  interest on demand deposits. 
This is a major incentive to engage in barter transactions, as is also 
the incentive to avoid taxation on interest paid. Even if interest were 
permitted to be paid on demand deposit accounts, individuals could 
benefit  by  accepting a lower interest  rate  on deposits in return for 
services rendered without charge because that would reduce the income 
reported on their income tax returns and hence reduce the tax they 
have to pay. 
In Canada, there was no prohibition on the payment of  interest on 
demand deposits, so this reason for the emergence of barter would not 
exist. However, the tax reason would certainly be present.  It seems 
to be in operation currently where interest is permitted to be paid on 
household demand  deposits,  but  how  much is paid depends on the 
volume of services rendered free of charge. 
So far as the failure to pay interest on reserves is concerned, that is 
currently viewed as tax. As a tax, it affects the allocation of resources 
but gives no particular reason for the imputation of income. A tax on 
tobacco, for example, is not viewed as a reason for the imputation of 
income to the tobacco industry. However, as in the case of  banking, 
it might lead to a strong incentive to engage in barter, in which case 
there might be noncash items of income that should be included. The 
tax implicit in the nonpayment  of interest on reserves has the same 392  Thomas K. Rymes 
effect as any other tax of raising the relative price of the item taxed 
and reducing the quantity, but again that is no reason to impute any 
items of income any more so than we do in other areas where taxes 
are imposed. 
With respect to the models, since they have nothing to do with the 
imputation of income to financial enterprises, have they any interest 
in their own right? There is nothing particularly  interesting or novel 
about the so-called neoclassical model. I do not understand Rymes’s 
argument that it is a shortcoming of the neoclassical model that it leaves 
no room for a  central bank.  If, as he  notes, reserves can be  held 
privately by banks, insurance and clearing services can be provided 
privately, with the result that competitive bank services would be ef- 
ficiently priced, service charges would cover banking costs, and prob- 
lems of measuring bank output would vanish, why is that a shortcoming? 
If this were the outcome, why is a central bank essential? 
Turning to the Keynesian general equilibrium model of banking that 
Rymes has fashioned, what is the basis for his assumption that there 
is saddlepoint instability in the economy that monetary authorities off- 
set? According to the model, agents know that authorities will engage 
in monetary reform to prevent inefficient outcomes. Suppose we grant 
these assumptions. Rymes’s argument that banking imputation is not 
needed in this case is unsustainable. If the wedge between what banks 
earn on loans and what they pay on deposits measures the price that 
banks and agents willingly pay for monetary stability services that the 
authorities provide, imputation is surely required to measure the mon- 
etary value of these services. Rymes’s answer is that the wedge  is 
immeasurable because the services are public in nature, not producible 
privately. Are not many government services not producible privately 
yet measurable by the cost the government incurs in providing those 
services? All sorts of arbitrary rules have had to be used to distinguish 
between those government activities that are to be regarded as inter- 
mediate goods and those that are to be regarded  as providing  final 
services. The cost of rendering these services is included in the national 
income except insofar as they are regarded as intermediate goods, in 
which case they are implicitly included in the sales prices of the final 
products for which these services are regarded as intermediate goods. 
Now drop the assumptions that agents know that monetary author- 
ities will provide the service of monetary stability and know instead 
that what the authorities will provide is likely to be monetary instability. 
Consider the two examples of monetary authority actions that Rymes 
himself  has suggested will be destabilizing but he contends the au- 
thorities will then take actions to undo, if and when they result in any 
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of deposits in the face of accelerating price levels. Agents who pur- 
chased money-market funds, instead of keeping deposits, paid a cost 
that  was imbedded  in  the market rate of  return.  Imputation would 
provide for deducting that cost as an expense. U.S. firms that now rely 
on sweeping and overnight repos to have their demand .deposits re- 
corded as zero on a daily basis incur a cost in engaging in this activity 
to avoid those deposits that pay no interest. In the Keynesian model 
that Rymes proposes, once one does not take for granted, as he does, 
that authorities will invariably provide monetary stability, the case for 
imputation is restored. 
Finally,  I do not accept Rymes’s argument against treating outside 
money as wealth in the private-sector  accounts. He argues that bank 
reserve assets cancel when matched with government deposits as  com- 
mercial bank  liabilities and  that such  shifts of government deposits 
from the central bank to commercial banks are the principal way in 
which inside money is created. His facts are wrong.  Reserves are a 
much larger magnitude than government  deposits at  commercial banks, 
and, in  this country, transfers of government deposits from central 
banks to commercial banks are dwarfed by open-market purchases and 
sales by the Federal Reserve in accounting for inside money creation. 
But, even if  Rymes were right about the magnitudes of reserves and 
government deposits, he tells us nothing about currency held by the 
public-the  much  larger component of  the monetary base than  re- 
serves. What offset is there for currency that would make their inclu- 
sion in private sector wealth unacceptable? 
Rymes’s paper suggests that research is needed to investigate the 
motives that have led to the use of  barter in financial transactions and 
their importance, how these motives are likely to be affected by the 
deregulation of banks, and how the volume of income imputed to fi- 
nancial intermediaries in this country after 1933 compared to  that before 
that time. 
Reply  Thomas K. Rymes 
Though I have profited from Dr. Schwartz’s comments, she does not 
understand the basic points of my paper. Before dealing with her com- 
ments, I reiterate one of its main neoclassical contentions. 
Though he is absolutely not responsible for anything said in this reply, the author is 
indebted to  Ehsan Choudhri for very helpful discussions on his paper, Dr. Schwartz’s 
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Employing the usual neoclassical assumption of global stability,  I 
investigate the consequence of the failure of the Monetary Authorities, 
in a world of near-costless fiat money' and in the context of an otherwise 
costless price  system (cf. McManus 1975), to pursue the Friedman- 
Lucas optimum money supply policy.  In my model, in which the fiat 
money  is  only  reserves voluntarily  held  by  competitive  banks, the 
failure takes the form, as is well  known, of the nonpayment  of the 
competitive real net rate of  return on such reserves. (It is understood 
that this encompasses the usual inflation tax argument.) The model is 
the optimal neoclassical monetary growth model with the banking sec- 
tor introduced in the manner (though necessarily emended) of Fischer 
(1983). With profit-maximizing firms and wealth-maximizing individu- 
als, the results of the failure that are of interest for this paper are that 
the rate of interest paid on deposits will be less than the competitive 
net real rate of return and that the service charges paid for the service 
rendered by the banks will be less than the value of the marginal product 
of the transaction service provided by the banks through bank deposits 
so that the service charges will not cover the costs of such services. 
The latter is exactly the measure of the Paretian inefficiency intro- 
duced into the economy by the failure of the Monetary Authorities to 
follow the Friedman-Lucas rule. (In a model in which the banks are 
ignored, this inefficient equilibrium is commonly described by the con- 
dition that the value of the marginal physical product or utility of the 
services of real money balances  [cf. Friedman 19691 will exceed the 
social marginal costs of providing such services.) The two conditions 
are exactly the conditions that give rise to the apparent necessity for 
the banking imputation in the national accounts. 
Should the Authorities follow the Friedman-Lucas rule,  however, 
the banks, more anxious to acquire reserves, will bid up interest rates 
on deposits, individuals will bid up service charges because the bank 
deposits that are the source of the services are more attractive to hold 
and to use, and, in accordance with the theoretical framework being 
employed, the overall price level, which must include the price of the 
service provided by the banks, will be lower. The result will  be that 
the rate of  interest on deposits will equal the going rate of return and 
that the service charges will meter the value of the marginal physical 
product of  bank  deposits and  the marginal  costs of providing  such 
services. Not only will the full efficiency associated with the Friedman- 
Lucas rule be captured, but there would also apparently be no need 
for the banking imputation. 
It is important to note that the only  source of inefficiency in  my 
model is the failure of the Authorities to pay the going rate of return 
on reserves. Should the Authorities require banks to hold reserves in 
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reserves ratios), the tax levied on reserves by  the failure to pay the 
going rate of return will be increased, and I conjecture that the observed 
differences in interest rates and between service charges and the costs 
of transaction services will also be increased.2 
The discussion so far permits me to deal with some of  Schwartz’s 
points. By Monetary  Authorities, I do not necessarily  mean central 
banks per se. Indeed, Monetary Authorities can take on a variety of 
institutional forms. The pre-1935 period in Canada to which she refers 
as offering evidence against my  hypothesis is characterized, through 
the operations of the Finance Act, by Canada’s chartered banks holding 
sume non-interest-bearing reserves (see Bordo and Redish 1987); how- 
ever, the Canadian monetary system for most of that time would not 
be characterized as having a near-costless fiat standard. If income taxes 
are offered as another explanation of banking data that seem to call 
for  the  banking imputation, then,  since Schwartz offers the  earlier 
period in Canada as evidence inconsistent with my  hypothesis, a dif- 
ficulty for her exists in that Canada did not have an income tax until 
1917. For many years after that, I would not want to argue that income 
taxes  on interest  income  were  such as to generate the barter-type 
arrangements she claims lie behind the banking statistics. There are 
other objections to her assertions. How are the taxes on interest income 
supposed to result in a reduction in the accompanying service charges 
for those deposits held by businesses; that is, why should businesses 
enter into such barter-type  arrangements with the banks? Why are 
interest rates higher in general on those deposits with lower reserve 
requirements, an observation that seems more consistent with exten- 
sions of  my  basic model, as noted in my  paper, than Schwartz’s ob- 
servations about income taxes. I am quite willing to admit, however, 
and subject to the qualifications noted, that income taxes may  play 
some role, but I should continue to argue that a principal reason for 
the problem is the pursuit of inefficient policies in the Friedman-Lucas 
sense by the Monetary Authorities. 1 quite agree with Schwartz that 
an additional reason is the prohibition of interest payments on deposits, 
but such prohibition I regard as part of inefficient regulation and su- 
pervision by the Monetary Authorities3  Indeed, arguments to the effect 
that Monetary  Authorities  should be  constrained constitutionally  to 
behave  according  to the Friedman-Lucas rule  are, in  my  view, the 
ultimate ones for the deregulation  of  financial intermediation  and a 
particular manifestation  of  the argument  that free banking,  that  is, 
private  banking without  inefficient regulation  by  the Monetary  Au- 
thorities, will result in  “unbundling”  and the Pareto-efficient pricing 
of the services banks render. 
Contrary, then, to Schwartz’s assertion that the optimal neoclassical 
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problem,  I maintain that it is central. She admits that there is a tax, 
that the existence of such a tax may lead to barter, and that, because 
of the barter, imputations should be made. Yet she then turns around 
and argues that, since it is a tax like any other tax, there are no reasons 
to impute any more than we do where other taxes lead people  and 
firms to engage in tax-minimizing activities. The inefficient monetary 
supply  rule  “tax”  is, I  should  argue, so essentially  different  in  its 
general equilibrium effects on the general level of prices that it must 
be treated differently  and is treated differently  if  the argument about 
the general equilibrium  effects on the competitive banking system is 
correct and if  the banking imputation is done.4 I therefore reject her 
assertion that the neoclassical monetary growth model with the banking 
system modeled  explicitly  with  the Monetary Authorities  failing  to 
follow the Friedman-Lucas rule has “nothing to do  with the imputation 
of income to financial enterprises  .”  Rather, I would have thought that 
it is rewarding to have a theory that predicts, other things being equal, 
that the interest rate and service charges data  for a competitive banking 
system give rise to the seeming need for the banking imputation and 
the resulting  effects  on the rates of  saving  and the conceptions of 
monetary wealth as measured in national accounting dealt with in my 
paper. Schwartz may be right that there are other reasons why such 
data require the imputations,  but her assertions and casual evidence 
in no way lead to nonconfirmation of my argument. I confess to enor- 
mous simplicity in the theoretical  structure presented, but the simple 
general equilibrium model of banking I advance is at least one of the 
usual ways of attempting to understand a problem in economics. 
I return now to my argument. It is the essence of the assumption of 
stability in the neoclassical optimum monetary supply model that the 
Monetary  Authorities  must  be constrained to follow  the Friedman- 
Lucas money supply policy rule. If they do, then the resulting outcome 
will, it is argued, match that set out in my paper and in  Schwartz’s 
comments, namely, that, among other things, competitive  bank services 
would be efficiently priced and no banking imputation would be nec- 
essary. Monetary Authorities  constrained to follow a rule, however, 
do not engage in discretionary  policy. Indeed, should the Authorities 
do so, the argument is that that would return us to the situation as- 
sociated with the inefficiencies of  Authorities not following the Friedman- 
Lucas rule. I failed to make clear that the neoclassical theory has no 
room for a Pareto-improving discretionary Monetary Authoritie~.~ 
I assumed stability in examining the neoclassical case. I also argue 
that a Keynesian central banking theory entails the need for discre- 
tionary monetary policy. I provide a potential rationale for that policy 
and collective Monetary Authorities by assuming saddlepoint instabil- 
ity. The discretionary policy modeled entails the abandonment of the 
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cessitating imputation. The imputation would be an attempt, in effect, 
to value the service of monetary stability provided by the Authorities. 
I know of no way this can be done. If I do not misunderstand Schwartz, 
she seems to be arguing that that service is properly valued by including 
in national income the value of the wages and salaries and intermediate 
inputs used by the authority, and she seems to be saying I am arguing 
against his procedure. I am not, but the procedure she sets out is not 
an imputation for the service of monetary stability any more than the 
value of  wages and salaries and intermediate inputs used by the Su- 
preme Court of Canada is a measure of the value of the public goods 
provided by the Court. 
It is the essence of the saddlepoint instability case that it provides 
a rationale for the existence of discretionary monetary policy. I do not 
believe I took for granted that the Authorities would always be suc- 
cessful. What the rational expectations model does in this case is pro- 
vide for the possibility of discretionary policy. Schwartz has been critical 
of  Monetary  Authorities  who have failed to provide  the  services of 
monetary stability (cf. Friedman and Schwartz 1963, esp. chap. 7), but 
it is quite unsatisfactory to admit the possibility of saddlepoint insta- 
bility and argue also that Monetary Authorities will always fail in the 
conduct of discretionary policy. It is equally unsatisfactory to assume 
stability and to argue that Monetary Authorities will be tempted to act 
in  a discretionary and disstabilizing fashion. If  one sees no role for 
Monetary Authorities, one will want, I suppose, to constrain them by 
constitutional rules for stable money (cf. Dorn and Schwartz 1987). If 
one admits, however, the possibility of a role for Monetary Authorities, 
then one must state clearly what it is. I do point out, then, that rules 
may not be sufficient to ensure stable money and that discretion may 
be necessary, and  I  specify the consequences for banking data, the 
measurement of  banking output, and the other empirical concerns of 
my  paper. I do not know what theory of  central banks, save perhaps 
that they are mischievious, Schwartz has. 
With the aid of the analysis in my  paper, consider the scenario set 
out by  Schwartz. The Monetary  Authorities  have  failed to contain 
unstable inflation. The inefficiencies associated with the inflation tax 
would then be experienced, that is, the fall in real wealth as exhibited 
in my  figure 7.3, because the Authorities fail to engage in the discre- 
tionary policy that ensures stable temporary equilibria. My  argument 
in  this case would be  that  the banking data would appear as those 
requiring the imputation. I leave it to the reader to imagine what the 
imputation, recommended  by  Schwartz in  this case, could possibly 
mean. 
Two final points. I specifically stated in my paper that I was ignoring 
circulating currency. I have already stated why. If the Monetary Au- 
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instead replaced private note issue with non-interest-bearing Authority 
currency, thereby enhancing the inefficiency of the money supply rule, 
I do not understand Schwartz’s argument that this should be regarded 
as an addition to wealth. The point about wealth measures I was trying 
to make is very simple. If the government purchases goods with money, 
then the additions to the money supply are indeed costly. It is not then 
the near-costless fiat money case I am considering. If the government 
replaces bonds with money, then the Ricardian equivalence theorems 
would raise questions about the money supply being part of net wealth. 
The mechanism for the creation of money, the switching of government 
accounts, was introduced merely to illustrate the idea that, in the case 
of potential instability, monetary wealth surely consists in the confi- 
dence of the community in the ability of the Authorities to maintain a 
stable monetary environment (cf. Klein  1978) and not in any “outsid- 
edness” of money. That some arbitrarily defined concept of outside 
money should determine what is the wealth of the community in the 
context in  which it  depends on the discretionary  conduct of policy 
seems simply beside the point, 
A general  theory of  imputation  in  the national  accounts and the 
effects that they have on the meaning of the measures of output, rates 
of saving, and wealth has yet to be written. Most theories would appear 
to have something to do with the costliness of the use of price systems 
and then are undertaken apparently only when otherwise anomalous 
results would “significantly”  appear. 
I have, in that context, set out a very simple but abstract argument 
based on the barest bones, as  I understand it, of the general equilibrium 
theory of private and central banking that is beginning to emerge. My 
argument might be wrong, and much I have no doubt missed. I regard 
Schwartz’s comments as helping me to sharpen the argument, but I 
wish she had directed her comments to the central theoretical concern 
of my paper. 
Notes 
I. Friedman and Schwartz (1986) note that the emergence of currencies based 
on a pure fiat  standard is a key development in the world monetary system. 
It is that world  with which I  am essentially concerned. By near costless,  I 
mean that I ignore the cost of production of fiat money but take costs of running 
the reserves system as being positive. 
2. In my paper, I did not consider circulating currency such as banknotes. 
Why? There is nothing in the theoretical framework permitting me to ascertain 
whether banknotes should be issued by the Authorities as monopoly issue or 
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with the Authorities, would issue bank notes on which, as history would seem 
to suggest has happened (cf. Goodhart 1988, chap. 4), interest might be paid. 
It would appear, though, that the sole issue by the Authorities of non-interest- 
bearing circulating currency notes is yet another way of  requiring the banks 
(and individuals) to hold non-interest-bearing monies and constitutes yet an- 
other tax on reserves and another departure from the Friedman-Lucas rule, 
thereby exacerbating the effects I discuss. 
3. As Schwartz notes, in Canada there is no prohibition of the payment on 
interest on deposits (cf. Freedman 1983). Up to the decennial revision of the 
banking legislation in Canada in 1967, however, chartered banks were prohib- 
ited from charging interest rates above 6 percent on consumer loans. When 
that regulation began to bind, the banks resorted to the same sort of subterfuges 
that the banks in the United States have done to undercut the limitation on 
interest rates on deposits (cf. Klein 1974). 
4. For an argument about the essential difference in the “inflation tax,” see 
Lucas (1986, 123), who argues, “Liquidity is not ‘another good’ nor, indeed, 
a ‘good’ at all.  It is the means to a subset of goods that an income tax has 
already taxed once.” 
5. The theory of central banking contained in Goodhart (1988) purports to 
show that, because of free-rider and moral hazard problems associated with 
costly information in the provision of banking, a nonprofit Monetary Authority 
will “evolve”  to meet the needs of competitive banks; that is, the Authority 
will be a way in which the private banks agree to constrain their opportunistic 
behavior so as to capture all the feasible gains from trade in banking. Goodhart 
argues that this Monetary Authority will be a government body. So far as I 
can see, no logical reason, arising out of the transactions cost theory of insti- 
tutional form, is provided as to why that Authority could not be one contained 
within the private sector. That is, there is nothing in Goodhart’s argument that 
would obviate (say) the Canadian Bankers’ Association from taking on the role 
of the Monetary Authority. The essence of Goodhart’s Monetary Authority is, 
however, that it engages in no discretionary monetary policy. 
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